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C .  S C O T T  H E M P H I L L  &  P H I L I P  J .  W E I S E R  
Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality to the Law of 
Predatory Pricing 
abstract.  This Feature offers a roadmap for bringing and deciding predatory pricing cases 
under the Supreme Court’s restrictive Brooke Group decision. Brooke Group requires a plaintiff to 
show that the defendant set a price below cost and had a sufficient likelihood of recouping its 
investment in predation. This framework, which was adopted without any contested presentation 
of its merits, has endured despite its flaws. Beyond this framework, the Court opined in dicta that 
predation is implausible. 
 We identify points of flexibility within the Court’s framework that permit an empirically 
grounded evaluation of the predation claim. Under the price-cost test, a plaintiff has leeway to 
select an appropriate measure of cost, including incremental cost. In considering recoupment, 
Brooke Group’s skeptical dicta should be confined to the particular market structure and theory of 
recoupment analyzed in that case. The dicta do not apply, for example, to a monopolist who re-
coups by earning a reputation for predation. A further reason to confine Brooke Group’s dicta is the 
Court’s highly unusual reweighing of the evidence presented at trial. As we explain using new 
historical research, this was not the Court’s initial plan after oral argument, but Justice Kennedy 
switched his vote. We also make the case against extending the price-cost test to more complex 
pricing strategies, such as loyalty discounts, in which the motivation for a stringent rule—to avoid 
costly false positives—has little purchase. 
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Werden, Tim Wu, and especially Doug Melamed, for valuable contributions and comments, and 
Gabrielle Daley for excellent research assistance. 
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introduction 
Over the past twenty-five years, antitrust claims alleging a predatory price 
cut have fallen into disuse. This can largely be attributed to the Supreme Court’s 
1993 decision in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
1
 which 
established the current framework for evaluating predatory pricing claims. Un-
der Brooke Group, a plaintiff must show that the alleged predator both set a price 
below cost and had a sufficient likelihood of recouping its predation-period 
losses through post-predation gains. The price-cost and recoupment tests are 
difficult to satisfy and were imposed to serve the Court’s stated goal to avoid 
condemning—and thereby chilling—procompetitive price cuts. Beyond this 
framework, Brooke Group offered the view, expressed in dicta, that predation is 
implausible. 
In this Feature, we reconsider the application of Brooke Group to modern pre-
dation cases and other pricing strategies. As we explain, Brooke Group’s two-part 
framework was adopted by the Court without any contested presentation of its 
merits, and both parts of the framework are subject to serious criticism.
2
 The 
price-cost test permits the exclusion of higher-cost rivals whose presence would 
otherwise place downward pressure on prices. The recoupment test exonerates 
some below-cost pricing whose condemnation would have little chilling effect 
on procompetitive conduct. Using the tests in tandem can yield inconsistent, 
even paradoxical, results. Despite these infirmities, however, the Brooke Group 
framework appears to be well entrenched in the Court’s jurisprudence.
3
 We 
therefore take the framework as given and suggest how best to apply it in prac-
tice, recognizing that the Court could revisit this precedent in an appropriate 
case. 
Our main contribution is to articulate the elements of a successful predation 
claim and explain how courts should operate within the strictures of Brooke 
Group. For example, suppose that an airline has monopoly power on a route be-
tween its hub and another major city. In response to new entry by a low-cost 
carrier (LCC), the incumbent drops its price and increases capacity on the route. 
The LCC gives up and exits the market, whereupon the incumbent returns to its 
previous price and quantity. Other entrants are thereby discouraged from chal-
lenging the incumbent on this and other routes. 
How should a court approach these facts? Using recent airline predation 
cases to illustrate our argument, we identify three elements of flexibility within 
 
1. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
2. See infra Section I.A. 
3. See infra Section I.A (describing the Supreme Court’s use of the Brooke Group framework in 
later cases). 
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the Brooke Group framework that, taken together, enable a court to conduct an 
empirically grounded evaluation of the predation claim. First, where the evi-
dence shows recoupment by a monopolist, Brooke Group’s skepticism does not 
apply. Brooke Group dealt with alleged recoupment by an oligopoly, with no con-
spiracy among its members to facilitate the scheme, a market structure that (in 
the Court’s view) made successful predation particularly unlikely. Monopolies 
are different. Second, a plaintiff is free, even under Brooke Group, to show that 
the defendant successfully recouped by acquiring a reputation for predation in 
other markets. The Brooke Group Court had no opportunity to consider reputa-
tion or any of the other modern economic theories under which recoupment is a 
rational strategy. Third, for purposes of the price-cost test, the plaintiff has lee-
way to select an appropriate measure of cost. Brooke Group itself used average 
variable cost, but anticipated the use of other measures, such as incremental 
cost.
4
 
The Court’s unusually detailed review of particular case facts in Brooke Group 
provides a further reason to confine Brooke Group’s dicta that predation is im-
plausible. As we explain using new historical research, the Court did not initially 
plan to provide such a detailed review of the case. The Justices initially voted to 
reverse the court of appeals, but Justice Kennedy switched his vote. His final 
opinion for the Court, affirming the judgment of the court below, relied on an 
unusual, fact-bound reassessment of the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court’s 
extensive review afforded numerous opportunities to express skepticism about 
the particular predatory strategy at issue in the case. Where real-world predation 
cases differ from the facts and theories that the Court considered in detail, the 
Court’s skeptical dicta from Brooke Group should not apply. 
Our secondary contribution is to caution against extending the Brooke Group 
framework into other areas of antitrust law. Using loyalty discounts as an exam-
ple, we argue against the extension of Brooke Group to pricing strategies that are 
more complex than the relatively simple price cutting at issue in predatory pric-
ing cases. Defendants and some commentators have argued that the Brooke 
Group framework, particularly the price-cost test, should be applied to such 
strategies. We disagree. In our view, the premises used to justify that test for 
simple price cutting do not apply to more complex strategies. 
This Feature proceeds in three Parts. Part I presents and criticizes the Brooke 
Group framework, placing the Court’s dicta within the context of the unusual, 
fact-bound case from which it emerged. Using airline predation as an example, 
Part II identifies points of flexibility when applying the recoupment and price-
 
4. Measures of incremental revenue may also be employed, subject to limitations discussed in 
Section II.C. 
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cost tests. Part III explains why the price-cost test should not be extended to the 
analysis of loyalty discounts. 
i .  the doctrine and dicta of brooke group  
This Part assesses the doctrine and dicta developed in Brooke Group. Section 
I.A provides a critical review of the two legal tests adopted by the Court. Section 
I.B describes the Court’s skeptical—and highly fact-bound—dicta. 
A. The Brooke Group Framework 
The Court’s opinion in Brooke Group set out, for the first time, two essential 
requirements that a plaintiff must establish for a successful claim of predatory 
pricing. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant set a price below its 
cost.
5
 The Court required an “appropriate” measure of cost, but left open which 
measure should be used.
6
 Second, a plaintiff must establish a likelihood of re-
coupment: a “reasonable prospect” or “dangerous probability”
7
 that the defend-
ant will “recoup[] its investment in below-cost prices.”
8
 Plaintiffs can establish 
recoupment by showing either an ex ante likelihood of recoupment, or that re-
coupment was achieved in fact.
9
 The price-cost and recoupment tests may be 
considered in either order. 
 
5. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223. Previous cases had reserved “as a formal matter” whether above-
cost prices could count. Id. 
6. Id. at 222. 
7. Id. at 224. “Reasonable prospect” is the standard for a nonconspiratorial oligopoly challenged 
under the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). “Dangerous probability” is the 
standard for predatory pricing by a monopolist under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (2012). Brooke Group analyzed a nonconspiratorial oligopoly while concluding that the 
fundamental test is the same under either standard. 
8. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224; see also Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Term 
and Antitrust: More Objectivity than Ever, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 327, 384 n.303 (1994) (“Until 
Brooke Group, recoupment as a separate element of the offense was exceptional.”). Matsushita 
Electronic Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. had discussed recoupment too, but not as a gen-
eral prerequisite to recovery. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
9. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 232-33 (describing ex ante and ex post recoupment); id. at 238 (con-
cluding that plaintiff had failed to show recoupment in either form). 
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1. Price-Cost Test 
Prior to Brooke Group, economists urged an approach to predatory pricing 
that minimized error costs.
10
 The application of any legal rule risks two types of 
error. In the antitrust context, the condemnation of procompetitive behavior is 
termed a “false positive.” Permitting anticompetitive behavior is called a “false 
negative.” The error costs of a substantive antitrust rule depend upon the harm 
and frequency of false positives and false negatives, including distortion in the 
conduct of firms in response to the rule. Determining the error costs of a partic-
ular rule is a complex task and requires a good understanding of the relevant 
inputs. In the case of predatory pricing, such a judgment depends in part on the 
frequency of procompetitive and anticompetitive price cuts, and the benefits and 
harms that arise from each.
11
 
The Court’s price-cost test reflects the avoidance of one type of error costs: 
false positives. The Court explained that price cuts are generally desirable—the 
“mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition” and “the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect.”
12
 As the Court saw it, a price cut—at least 
as long as the price remains above cost—is unambiguously desirable because it 
increases output, thereby raising total and consumer welfare. A false condemna-
tion of an innocent price cut is thus costly because it “chills” desirable price 
cuts.
13
 That is, the major problem is not the erroneous result in the case at hand, 
but rather the potential for the false condemnation to discourage other price cuts. 
The Court’s approach accepts some false negatives—anticompetitive above-
cost price cuts—in order to avoid the chilling effect of false positives.
14
 Such a 
lenient rule, however, can be costly. An important source of false negatives is 
above-cost price cuts that exclude a higher cost rival whose presence otherwise 
would have constrained the dominant firm’s prices. Moreover, some excluded 
entrants would have become more efficient if enabled to grow, gain scale, and 
 
10. An early, influential example is Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyz-
ing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979). 
11. For a discussion of error costs in antitrust law, see Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After 
Brooke Group: An Economic Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 591-93 (1994). As Baker also 
discusses in later work, the Chicago School project heavily emphasizes false positives and 
downplays the importance of false negatives. Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error 
Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2015). 
12. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226 (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 
122 n.17 (1986)). 
13. Id. (“[M]istaken inferences . . . are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect.” (quoting Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122 n.17)); see also id. 
(“[T]he costs of an erroneous finding of liability are high.”). 
14. See Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 952 (2002) (dis-
cussing the tradeoff between the costs of underinclusion and overinclusion). 
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learn by doing. A further cost of a lenient rule is that other firms that might be 
deterred from entering after they observe aggressive price cuts aimed at exclud-
ing earlier entrants. In short, the long-run welfare costs of exclusion from pred-
atory price cutting could be much greater than the short-run benefits of lower 
prices. 
Brooke Group did not deny that its test is underinclusive,
15
 but defended its 
rule on the ground that a more aggressive test that extended liability to above-
cost price cuts was “beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control 
without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-cutting.”
16
 The 
Court further asserted in dicta that false negatives would be rare, quoting its 
statements in earlier cases that “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and 
even more rarely successful.”
17
 
As discussed below, this famous dictum about predatory pricing was offered 
without adequate empirical support.
18
 Indeed, it relied on a selective evaluation 
of the academic literature, including John McGee’s controversial 1958 article con-
cluding that Standard Oil had not engaged in predation.
19
 It was also immaterial 
to the case at hand. In the first place, the Court seems to have meant the term 
“predatory pricing” to encompass only below-cost pricing; even if that were rare, 
it would tell us little about whether firms engage in successful schemes to exclude 
rivals by price cutting that does not entail below-cost prices. More important, 
the Court plainly believed that it was clear from earlier case law that below-cost 
pricing could be illegal,
20
 and was presumably therefore deterred by existing law. 
Nonetheless, it held that defendants needed the additional recoupment arrow in 
their quiver in order to minimize the chilling effect of false positives. 
 
15. The Court exonerated the “exclusionary effect” of above-cost price cuts on two distinct 
grounds: either (1) because they were directed at a higher-cost competitor and hence (the 
Court thought) “competition on the merits,” or (2) because such price cuts are “beyond the 
practical ability” of courts to distinguish. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223. The Court apparently 
recognized that above-cost price cuts can sometimes exclude lower-cost competitors; other-
wise, the second reason would be unnecessary. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 226 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 
(1986)). 
18. See infra Section I.B.3. 
19. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589-90 (citing John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard 
Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137, 157 (1958)); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Revisiting the 
Revisionist History of Standard Oil, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 573 (2012) (rebutting McGee’s conclusion 
that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing). 
20. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-23 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 
117 (1986), and Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585 n.8, among other cases). 
the yale law journal 127:2048  2018 
2054 
2. Recoupment Test 
The Brooke Group Court’s analysis of error costs contained an important gap. 
The Court defended the price-cost test by reference to error costs, but did not 
analyze the recoupment test with similar care.
21
 To see why this is problematic, 
consider that the recoupment test has bite in a subset of cases the Court refers to 
as “unsuccessful predation.”
22
 This refers to cases where the defendant sets a 
price below cost, but (1) was unlikely ex ante to recoup enough profit to make 
the strategy profitable overall; and (2) failed in fact to recoup such profits ex 
post. 
The Court concluded that unsuccessful predation is harmless because the 
low prices benefit consumers (“a boon to consumers”
23
), and hence, condemn-
ing unsuccessful predation is a further form of false positive.
24
 The conclusion 
that unsuccessful predation is harmless is not quite right, because below-cost 
prices are distortive even when they do not exclude, a point the Court quietly 
acknowledged in part.
25
  But more importantly, the Court failed to address 
whether (and on what theory) condemning unsuccessful predation would chill 
desirable price cuts. After all, punishing the typical case of unsuccessful preda-
tion—below-cost pricing by a would-be predator who is irrational or mistaken 
about the profitability of the scheme—is not likely to chill price competition 
when profitability does not depend on recoupment.
26
 
 
21. The final paragraph of Part II.A of the Court’s opinion discusses error costs and contains sev-
eral of the quotations discussed above. The paragraph immediately follows a discussion of 
recoupment but pertains to the overall approach, not the recoupment test in particular. It be-
gins, “[t]hese prerequisites to recovery are not easy to establish,” and the “prerequisites” are 
the price-cost and recoupment tests. Id. at 226. 
22. Id. at 224. 
23. Id.  
24. Id. (“Without [recoupment], predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices . . . , and 
consumer welfare is enhanced.”). 
25. Id. (acknowledging “inefficient substitution”). 
26. See Louis Kaplow, Recoupment, Market Power, and Predatory Pricing, ANTITRUST L.J.  
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 38), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty 
/searlecenter/events/antitrust/documents/Kaplow_MPRecoup6.417.pdf [http://perma.cc
/V93F-JLCX]. 
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3. Interaction of the Tests 
The Brooke Group framework sets up a tension between the price-cost and 
recoupment tests.
27
 A price below cost is, in effect, prima facie evidence that the 
firm thought it could recoup its predatory price cut. That action suggests, at a 
minimum, that the firm believed that recoupment was likely. After all, to set such 
a price and not expect to recoup later profits on account of predation is incon-
sistent with rational profit-maximizing behavior. Thus, where the recoupment 
requirement affects the outcome of a case, that result is either a false negative or 
else an instance where the would-be predator is irrational or mistaken, whether 
due to a miscalculation or becoming the unlucky “victim” of changed market 
conditions.
28
 
The recoupment test makes most sense, not as an additional substantive re-
quirement for anticompetitive predation, but as a hedge against an erroneous 
factual determination of below-cost pricing.
29
 The idea is that, to guard against 
a false positive from a mistaken application of the price-cost test, courts should 
also require proof that recoupment was likely because, if it were not likely, the 
defendant would not have deliberately sold at a price below cost. 
But if that is the rationale, the two tests should be viewed as factors inform-
ing a single overall analysis, rather than as sharply distinct inquiries.
30
  The 
Brooke Group decision would be less problematic if it explicitly allowed recoup-
ment evidence to inform the price-cost inquiry, and vice versa. Even as written, 
the Brooke Group framework does not preclude this approach. Consider, for ex-
ample, a case where there is clear documentary evidence of pricing below cost. 
In such a case, it is reasonable to conclude that the defendant had an ex ante 
 
27. Even “[i]f circumstances indicate that below-cost pricing could likely produce its intended 
effect on the target,” such harm to a competitor is not enough. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225. 
“[T]here is still the further question whether it would likely injure competition in the relevant 
market.” Id.; see also id. at 224 (noting that harm to rivals from below-cost pricing “is of no 
moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured”). 
28. There are also circumstances where a naïve application of the price-cost test might yield a 
potential false positive—for example, when a firm introduces a product with temporary low 
prices, or sets a low price in anticipation of later scale economies. But such potential false 
positives are not solved by the recoupment test, because presumably such strategies will be 
profitable in the later period. Put the other way, a finding of no recoupment casts doubt on 
both the predation explanation and the competing “later scale economies” story, rather than 
cleanly distinguishing between them. Kaplow, supra note 26, provides an extensive discussion 
of the test’s inability to distinguish between competing explanations for the defendant’s con-
duct. 
29. This approach works best if the court is equipped with a robust understanding of the full 
range of modern recoupment theories. 
30. See Kaplow, supra note 26 (manuscript at 13-17) (discussing triangulation). 
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expectation, and thus likelihood, of recoupment. A court applying the Brooke 
Group framework should conclude that such evidence outweighs equivocal ex-
pert evidence about whether the industry’s market structure supports recoup-
ment.
31
 
A pragmatic approach to the Brooke Group framework suggests a flexible ap-
plication of both tests. Under this approach, the sharper the price cut and the 
larger the profit sacrifice, the stronger the indication that the defendant expected 
ex ante to recoup.
32
  On the other hand, clear evidence about recoupment 
(whether positive or negative) should outweigh equivocal evidence about prices. 
This approach shares a kinship to cases that treat profit sacrifice as an indication 
of market power.
33
 And indeed, the analysis of recoupment closely resembles the 
analysis of market power, which is already an explicit requirement in predatory 
pricing cases decided under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
4. Adoption Without Analysis 
The limits of the Brooke Group framework reflect the unique manner in 
which the Court decided the case. Notably, because of how the parties argued 
the case, the Court accepted the price-cost and recoupment tests with little anal-
ysis. During oral argument, the plaintiff conceded that it had the burden to show 
both below-cost prices and a likelihood of recoupment.
34
 Without any contested 
 
31. Brooke Group does place one limit on this approach. If the only evidence of recoupment comes 
from below-cost pricing, that is not enough. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226 (“Evidence of 
below-cost pricing is not alone sufficient to permit an inference of probable recoupment and 
injury to competition.”). 
32. We thus reject the suggestion that a steep price cut reduces the likelihood of predation because 
it makes recoupment more difficult to accomplish. That approach gets things backwards, as 
explained in C. Scott Hemphill, The Role of Recoupment in Predatory Pricing Analyses, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 1581, 1592-93 (2001). 
33. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (noting that “the ‘size 
of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong 
indicator of power’”) (quoting 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 2046, at 351 (3d ed. 2012)). 
34. See Transcript of Oral Argument at *5, Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (No. 92-466), 1993 WL 754943 (“We accept the burden of show-
ing that prices were discriminatory, below average variable cost, and were undertaken with a 
reasonable prospect of recoupment.”). As Stephen Calkins notes, discussing the academic 
work of Philip Areeda, plaintiff ’s counsel, “[i]t would have been awkward for Areeda to have 
done otherwise, since his writings seemed to support a recoupment requirement.” Calkins, 
supra note 8, at 384 n.304. Areeda was even more closely associated with a price-cost test. See 
Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699-700 (1975). 
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presentation of the two tests, the Court had no real opportunity to assess their 
merits. 
The effect of this deprivation is visible in the internal analysis of the Court.
35
 
The papers of Justice Blackmun, a Brooke Group dissenter, contain several mem-
oranda written by the Justice’s clerk assigned to the case. One memo analyzed 
Justice Kennedy’s draft opinion for the Court and identified its main holding 
(“the only actual law made”) as the adoption of the price-cost and recoupment 
tests.
36
 The clerk noted by way of explanation that both parties had “agreed upon 
these requirements, and I did not understand any of the Justices to find either of 
them objectionable.”
37
 This perspective, to the extent it might have been shared 
more broadly by the Justices, is very surprising, since the Court was announcing 
important new rules without any contested presentation of their merits. More-
over, the Court relied on Matsushita’s dated and selective review of the academic 
literature to justify its test and its imprudent (and now famous) dictum about 
the rarity of predatory pricing.
38
 In light of this history, and the limits of the test, 
courts should be leery of extending this test without careful consideration. 
The clerk’s further conclusion that the decision was “very narrow” rested in 
part on the assumption that the holding was limited to the type of predation 
claim at issue: predation by an oligopoly without any conspiracy among its 
members to facilitate the scheme, and pursued not under the Sherman Act but 
under a different antitrust statute, the Robinson-Patman Act.
39
 Several courts of 
appeals subsequently reached the same conclusion that Brooke Group does not 
 
35. Cf. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust in the O’Connor-Rehnquist Era: A View from Inside the Supreme 
Court, ANTITRUST, Summer 2006, at 21 (using papers of Justice Blackmun and other Justices 
to examine several other antitrust cases). 
36. Memorandum from Sherry Colb to Justice Blackmun 1 (May 28, 1993) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress) (“I have read Justice Kennedy’s opinion in the case, from which you, Jus-
tice White and Justice Stevens voted to dissent at Conference . . . . The grounds of the decision 
here are very narrow. The only actual law made by this decision is the provision of two re-
quirements to prove a Robinson-Patman Act predatory price discrimination claim: (1) below-
cost pricing, and (2) a reasonable prospect of recoupment. Both pet[itione]r and resp[ond-
ent] agreed upon these requirements, and I did not understand any of the Justices to find 
either of them objectionable.”). 
37. Id. 
38. See infra Section I.B.3. 
39. See supra note 7. 
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apply to the Sherman Act or monopolists.
40
 Later Supreme Court cases, how-
ever, came to a different conclusion.
41
 In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hard-
wood Lumber Co., the Court held that the framework applies to the evaluation of 
predatory bidding under the Sherman Act.
42
 And in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. 
linkLine Communications, Inc., the Court embraced Brooke Group’s price-cost test 
in the analysis of price squeezes.
43
 
The Brooke Group framework appears to be well entrenched, notwithstand-
ing its infirmities and its adoption without any contestation of its merits. But the 
tests are not set in stone. In antitrust cases, the modern Court openly embraces 
new economic thinking as a basis for changing its mind. To that end, it recently 
declared that, in the antitrust field, the Court has “felt relatively free to revise 
[its] legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse anti-
trust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”
44
 For 
purposes of this Feature, we take as given the Brooke Group framework, but rec-
ognize that the Court could revisit this precedent in an appropriate case. 
B. Dicta 
The Court’s dicta in Brooke Group—the “music” of the opinion—reflects a 
deeply skeptical attitude toward predatory pricing claims. The Court com-
mented on the “general implausibility of predatory pricing,”
45
 suggesting that 
“predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely success-
ful”
46
 and concluding that “the costs of an erroneous finding of liability are 
 
40. See, e.g., LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (suggesting that 
“nothing in the decision suggests” that the Brooke Group decision is “applicable to a monopo-
list”); see also Spirit Airlines v. Nw. Airlines, 431 F.3d 917, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding 
that even if defendant priced above cost, plaintiff could pursue a section 2 theory notwith-
standing Brooke Group). 
41. See ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 274 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting later Su-
preme Court cases as a basis for disregarding the suggestion in LePage’s that Brooke Group does 
not apply broadly). 
42. 549 U.S. 312, 315 (2007). 
43. 555 U.S. 438, 448-55 (2009). 
44. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412-13 (2015); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 
522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) (switching from per se liability to the rule of reason for maximum resale 
price maintenance while noting that “this Court has reconsidered its decisions construing the 
Sherman Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious 
question”). 
45. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). 
46. Id. at 226 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 
(1986)). 
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high.”
47
 The basis for the Court’s unfriendly dicta was contingent upon the par-
ticular market structure at issue, the Court’s highly unusual review of the evi-
dence, and its reliance on a selective reading of the academic literature. Together, 
these limitations suggest that Brooke Group’s skeptical dicta should be confined 
to the factual context of that case. 
1. Oligopoly Recoupment 
An important source of the Court’s inhospitality towards predatory pricing 
cases is the unusual facts presented in Brooke Group. Because the cigarette makers 
were an oligopoly and were not alleged to have been acting in concert, recoup-
ment by supracompetitive pricing was thought to be less likely than if the de-
fendant were a single, monopoly cigarette maker. Oligopoly recoupment would 
have required sharing gains among multiple firms, which would have led to a 
much smaller payoff to the firm accused of below-cost pricing compared to a 
situation where the firm was a monopoly. Further, the required oligopoly coor-
dination itself would have been a daunting challenge. As the Court put it: “This 
anticompetitive minuet is most difficult to compose and to perform, even for a 
disciplined oligopoly.”
48
 
The Court’s conclusion on this point is doubtful. As Justice Stevens’s dissent 
pointed out, the manufacturers had a long history of “supracompetitive, parallel 
pricing,” including “lockstep” price increases twice a year.
49
 This history made 
successful coordination more likely: “I would suppose, however, that the profes-
sional performers who had danced the minuet for 40 to 50 years would be better 
able to predict whether their favorite partners would follow them in the future 
than would an outsider, who might not know the difference between Haydn and 
Mozart.”
50
 Whatever the merits of the Court’s analysis, the important point is 
that the Court’s dicta was written in a particularized factual setting in which suc-
cessful predation was thought to be particularly unlikely.
51
 
 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 228. Further, just one member of the cigarette oligopoly committed the unlawful con-
duct, and its strategy was meant to discipline the victim, rather than exclude it. 
49. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
50. Id. at 257. This quotation adds a further critique of the Court—that the Court wrongly believed 
that its own independent analysis of coordination was more accurate than the evidence of 
below-cost pricing, which itself suggested the likelihood of recoupment. 
51. A further limitation of the Court’s analysis is that disciplining a single member of an oligopoly 
is often easy and effective. 
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2. Unusual Review of the Evidence 
The importance of the particular facts is reflected in the Court’s unusually 
deep dive into the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals had affirmed 
a judgment for defendants, notwithstanding a jury verdict for plaintiffs, holding 
that one of the unusual facts described above—recoupment by an oligopoly—
made recoupment too implausible to support liability as a matter of law.
52
 The 
Supreme Court rejected that extreme view. 
The Court might have stopped there, reversing and remanding for further 
proceedings. Indeed, Justice Blackmun’s notes from Conference indicate that five 
Justices had initially supported this disposition: the three Justices (Stevens, 
White, and Blackmun) who ultimately dissented, plus Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice Kennedy.
53
 The remaining four Justices had voted to affirm. Had the 
Court issued a narrow reversal in accordance with this initial vote, there would 
be no occasion for fact-bound skepticism about successful recoupment. 
In what would have been an equally benign holding, an overlapping coalition 
of five Justices expressed interest in dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvi-
dently granted, on the ground that no issue of law was truly presented by the 
case.
54
 This position contrasts sharply with the ultimate result of the case, which 
made new law by requiring the price-cost and recoupment tests. Had the Court 
taken this path and simply dismissed the writ of certiorari, the effect would be 
similar to affirmance (as far as the parties were concerned). But then there would 
be no Brooke Group opinion at all; the lower court’s judgment for defendants 
would be the final word. Five Justices, all of whom ultimately joined the opinion 
of the Court, favored this approach: Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter, 
plus—once again—Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. Justice Stevens 
circulated a memo to the Justices the day after Conference, arguing that plaintiff 
(the petitioner) did not agree that no legal issue was presented by the case, and 
hence dismissal was not an appropriate result.
55
 Ultimately, the dismissal idea 
was dropped, though in helping to defeat it, Justice Stevens may have opened a 
path to affirmance despite his own preference for reversal. 
 
52. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(“To rely on the characteristics of an oligopoly to assure recoupment of losses from a predatory 
pricing scheme after one oligopolist has made a competitive move is . . . economically irra-
tional.”).  
53. Notes from Conference (Mar. 31, 1993) (on file with the Library of Congress). The votes to 
reverse and remand or vacate and remand are indicated in Justice Blackmun’s notes by “RR,” 
“VR,” or simply “–.” 
54. Id. (noting that five Justices indicated an inclination to “DIG”). 
55. Memorandum to the Conference (Apr. 1, 1993). 
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Justice Blackmun’s clerk, in a memo evaluating whether the Court should 
dismiss the writ, worried that Justice Kennedy might change his vote from re-
verse to affirm.
56
 The next day, the Justices voted again. Both Justice Kennedy 
and the Chief Justice switched their votes to affirm, making the vote 6-3 to af-
firm.
57
 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, affirming the judgment below, re-
lied upon an extensive and highly unusual review of the record.
58
 The opinion 
ultimately concluded that the evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable 
to plaintiff, could not support recoupment. Justice Stevens, forced into dissent, 
criticized this approach as unwise and unjustified, and noted that the majority 
imposed an improper burden of proof of the plaintiff.
59
 The Court’s extensive 
review afforded numerous opportunities to express skepticism about the partic-
ular predatory strategy at issue in the case.
60
 As a result, the Court’s skepticism 
about liability is rooted, in part, in the details of its unusually deep, particular-
ized inquiry. 
3. Selective Reliance on Literature About Recoupment 
A final source of Brooke Group’s inhospitality to predatory pricing claims was 
the Chicago School perspective about the low likelihood of successful predation. 
For example, consider the Court’s famous statement that predation is “rarely 
 
56. Memorandum from Sherry Kolb to Justice Blackmun 1 (Mar. 31, 1993) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress) (“I am not confident about the result. Five Justices voted the right way 
(i.e., to reverse and remand). However, when Justice Kennedy voted to reverse, he also said 
that he was ‘close to Nino.’ Since Justice Scalia’s vote was to affirm, and he said that the bar 
would be ‘shocked’ if the Court reversed, I worry that Justice Kennedy’s vote may change.”). 
These comments by Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia are reflected in (and likely based on) 
Justice Blackmun’s Conference notes. See Notes from Conference, supra note 53. The Confer-
ence notes suggest that Justice Kennedy expressed interest in the full range of outcomes: re-
versal, dismissal, or affirmance. 
57. See Notes from Conference, supra note 53 (additional annotation recording vote on April 2, 
1993, with 6-3 to affirm); Docket, No. 92-466, available in Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Harold J. Spaeth, The Digital Archive of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun, WASH. U. ST. 
LOUIS (2007), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/blackmunDockets/1992/Paid/docket-92 
-466.pdf [http://perma.cc/6G73-4MC4] (noting, in blue pencil, the results of revote taken 
on April 2, 1993). The docket sheet suggests that the Chief Justice’s preference at the second 
vote was dismissal as a first choice, affirmance as a second choice. 
58. The Court’s opinion acknowledged the unusual nature of this inquiry. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. 
at 230 (“It is not customary for this Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence . . . .”). 
59. Id. at 244, 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
60. See, e.g., id. at 230-31 (noting the “complex chain of cause and effect” at issue); id. at 238 (con-
cluding that plaintiff failed to provide evidence of actual or likely supracompetitive pricing). 
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tried, and even more rarely successful.”
61
 This stark view was not the result of 
the Court’s own analysis, but rather a partial quotation of the Court’s 1986 opin-
ion in Matsushita. Matsushita, which dealt with oligopoly (like Brooke Group), 
attributed this conclusion to a “consensus among commentators.”
62
 Matsushita 
based its assertion of consensus on works by Chicago School scholars Robert 
Bork, Frank Easterbrook, and John McGee, from the early 1980s or before, that 
emphasized the uncertainties of recoupment, including the possibilities that the 
predation would not exclude rivals and that new entry would prevent profit-tak-
ing.
63
 The Court selectively relied on this literature, which was contested at the 
time and which later work has undermined.
64
 Consequently, the kind of skepti-
cism reflected in Brooke Group is inapt when a plaintiff relies on modern eco-
nomic learning not presented to or relied on by the Court. 
i i .  applying brooke group  
Some observers worry that, after Brooke Group, a meritorious predation case 
is almost impossible to win. While it is true that no predatory pricing case (as 
far as we know) has been litigated to a final judgment for plaintiffs,
65
 this is not 
 
61. Id. at 226 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 
(1986)). 
62. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589 (“[T]here is a consensus among commentators that predatory 
pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”). 
63. Id. at 589-90 (citing, inter alia, ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT 
WAR WITH ITSELF 145 (1978); Frank Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 
289, 295-97 (1980); McGee, supra note 19, at 157). 
64. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic 
Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239 (2000) (offering theoretical and empirical support 
for predation as a rational strategy). 
65. This is true as of November 2017. For an earlier assessment of the case law, see Edlin, supra 
note 14, at 941 (reaching the same conclusion as of 2002). See also Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox 
of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 n.58 (2005) (reporting favorable plaintiff ’s ver-
dict and subsequent settlement in a case decided under Texas law). 
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too revealing, as very few antitrust cases reach a final judgment. Numerous pred-
atory pricing cases have survived summary judgment,
66
 while others have sur-
vived dismissal.
67
 It is likely that still other cases have settled favorably without 
ever leaving a notable opinion.
68
 
This is not to say that winning a predation case, even with strong facts, is 
easy. Far from it. Our claim is only that predation cases are not hopeless, and our 
project is to provide guidance to litigants and courts about the right approach. 
Thus, in this Part, we consider how courts (and parties) can and should adapt 
Brooke Group to the facts of real-world predation cases. Courts can accept the 
framework—both the price-cost test and the recoupment test—without accept-
ing dicta that does not apply to the factual setting of their particular cases. In-
deed, Brooke Group itself invites adaptation as to both tests. 
As noted in the Introduction, we identify three points of flexibility regarding 
Brooke Group. Section II.A explains that where the evidence pertains to recoup-
ment by a monopolist, the conditions of recoupment are more favorable than 
those in Brooke Group, and the Court’s skepticism should not apply. The same is 
true of an oligopoly whose members, unlike the cigarette manufacturers in 
Brooke Group, enter a predatory pricing conspiracy. Section II.B argues that, 
where the recoupment strategy is different from the strategy Brooke Group con-
sidered, the court should maintain an open mind. In particular, a plaintiff is free 
to allege recoupment under any of the modern economic theories of predation, 
such as the establishment of a reputation for predation. Section II.C describes 
 
66. E.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005); Multistate Legal 
Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 
1995); Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D. Ga. 1994); 
Cont’l Airlines v. Am. Airlines, 824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex. 1993). In Continental Airlines, 
plaintiffs’ predation claim was tried to verdict in August 1993, a few months after Brooke Group 
was decided. See Jury Verdict for American Airlines, AMR Corp., Cont’l Airlines v. Am. Air-
lines, 824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (No. 3:92-CV-00259). 
67. E.g., Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp. v. Gerber Products Co., 69 Fed. Appx. 350, 352 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding that plaintiff properly pled below-cost pricing in its bids for government con-
tracts); Aventura Cable Corp. v. Rifkin/Narragansett S. Fla. CATV Ltd. P’ship, 941 F. Supp. 
1189 (S.D. Fla. 1996); see also Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 374 F.3d 1044, 1051–
52 (11th Cir. 2004) (denying dismissal as to price squeeze allegations evaluated under Brooke 
Group). We omit cases where the predation allegations were perfunctory or idiosyncratic. 
68. The list is longer if discounting and bundling cases are included. See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, 
Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 722, 725-26 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (describing jury 
verdict in favor of plaintiff in a bundling case); Company News; Brunswick To Settle Pricing 
Suits for $65 Million, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/23/busi-
ness/company-news-brunswick-to-settle-pricing-suits-for-65-million.html [http://
perma.cc/9RE6-7E8Y] (describing settlement in a probable discounting case); see also Crane, 
supra note 65, at 15-16 (discussing both cases). 
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the leeway that a plaintiff has, for purposes of the price-cost test, in selecting an 
appropriate measure of cost and revenue. 
Although the analysis has general applicability, we illustrate our points in the 
context of a particular industry: airlines. The airline industry represents a useful 
example, given Alfred Kahn’s opinion that, in contrast to the Supreme Court’s 
view, airline predation was neither “rarely attempted” nor “rarely successful,”
69
 
the Department of Transportation’s conclusion that incumbent airlines predated 
in response to LCC entry in the 1990s,
70
 and a pair of major predation cases—
United States v. AMR Corp.
71
 and Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
72
—
which resulted in appellate opinions at summary judgment.
73
 
A. Monopoly Recoupment 
The Brooke Group opinion invites a flexible, context-specific approach to re-
coupment. For example, the Court prescribes “a close analysis of both the scheme 
alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions of the relevant market.”
74
 
As for market structure and conditions, recoupment is unlikely “[i]n certain sit-
uations,” but not all.
75
 Recoupment is unlikely, and hence “summary disposi-
tion . . . is appropriate,” “where the market is highly diffuse and competitive, or 
where new entry is easy, or the defendant lacks” the ability to absorb the rival’s 
sales.
76
 And at least one precondition for recoupment—whether a price cut is ca-
pable of causing exit or altering behavior—depends on a variety of factors.
77
 The 
 
69. Alfred E. Kahn, Alfred Kahn on Predation at Air Hubs: An AAI Column, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 
(Dec. 7, 1999), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/alfred-kahn-predation-air-hubs 
-aai-column [http://perma.cc/4EVU-KEBX] (“There are in fact strong reasons to believe 
that, at least so far as the airlines business is concerned, the Supreme Court’s view . . . is 
simply incorrect.”). 
70. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPETITION IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC AIRLINE INDUSTRY: 
THE NEED FOR A POLICY TO PREVENT UNFAIR PRACTICES: REVISED 8 (1998); see also id. (at-
tachment describing four examples in detail); Chris Sagers, “Rarely Tried, and . . . Rarely Suc-
cessful”: Theoretically Impossible Price Predation Among the Airlines, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 919, 924-
25 (2009) (collecting sources noting presence of airline predation). 
71. 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). 
72. 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005). 
73. Airline predation cases are enormously complicated, and we are not attempting a comprehen-
sive review. 
74. Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 225 (enumerating as factors “the extent and duration of the alleged predation, the relative 
financial strength of the predator and its intended victim, and their respective incentives and 
will”). 
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Court thus recognized that the result of the recoupment analysis varies from case 
to case. 
One source of flexibility arises where a monopoly, rather than oligopoly, is 
concerned. If recoupment is undertaken by a monopoly protected by high barri-
ers to entry, we are far from the oligopoly considered in Brooke Group. Airlines 
offer a suitable example. Although the airline industry is commonly described as 
oligopolistic, particular routes are sometimes dominated by individual firms, 
particularly at an incumbent airline’s hub. 
For example, in Spirit Airlines, the Sixth Circuit considered alleged predation 
by Northwest Airlines at its Detroit hub.
78
 Spirit, an LCC, introduced nonstop 
service from Detroit to Philadelphia and Boston. In response to low-price com-
petition from the LCC, Northwest matched the fares on both routes and added 
capacity.
79
 Spirit presented evidence of a high Northwest market share on both 
routes (72% and 89% prior to entry, respectively) and significant barriers to en-
try, including brand loyalty and control of scarce gates.
80
  The district court 
granted summary judgment to Northwest. The Sixth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the case for trial.
81
 In doing so, the court recognized a “corollary” to 
Brooke Group’s statement about market structure: “where the market is highly 
concentrated, the barriers to entry are high, the defendant has market power and 
excess capacity, and evidence of actual recoupment is present, summary judg-
ment is inappropriate.”
82
 The Sixth Circuit’s analysis ultimately rested not only 
on evidence about structure, but also upon evidence of actual recoupment by 
Northwest from fewer flights and higher prices once Spirit exited the market.
83
 
We are also skeptical that Brooke Group addresses how to approach tacit co-
ordination by a stable oligopoly. In Brooke Group, the Court painted the cigarette 
 
78. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir. 2005). 
79. Id. at 924. 
80. Id. at 923. 
81. Id. at 953. The trial never happened because Northwest Airlines went bankrupt for unrelated 
reasons. See U.S. Airlines File for Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/09/15/business/worldbusiness/us-airlines-file-for-bankruptcy 
-protection.html [http://perma.cc/WS6Q-C94A]. 
82. Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d at 931. 
83. Id. at 951 (noting the incongruity that, after Spirit exited the Detroit-Philadelphia market, 
Northwest “dropped flights notwithstanding the increased customer demand of ‘price-sensi-
tive travelers’ for those routes”). 
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business as highly dynamic, with price competition apt to break out at any mo-
ment.
84
 In other cases, where the stability of oligopoly is supported by high lev-
els of concentration, substantial profits, and a low likelihood of entry, the use of 
predatory pricing to deter entry should be a cause for concern. Indeed, as this 
market structure has become the norm in important industries, this scenario is 
hardly a hypothetical concern. As a recent Goldman Sachs report explained, tout-
ing the profitability of such industries: 
There is a natural pull toward consolidation among mature or maturing 
industries. An oligopolistic market structure can turn a cut-throat com-
modity industry into a highly profitable one. Oligopolistic markets are 
powerful because they simultaneously satisfy multiple critical compo-
nents of sustainable competitive advantage—a smaller set of relevant 
peers faces lower competitive intensity, greater stickiness and pricing 
power with customers due to reduced choice, scale cost benefits includ-
ing stronger leverage over suppliers, and higher barriers to new entrants 
all at once.
85
 
The report emphasized a number of industries as potentially fulfilling its 
“dreams of oligopoly,” including airlines, beer, and wireless telephony.
86
 
Although Brooke Group expressed skepticism about oligopoly recoupment, 
the Court recognized that it all depends on the facts: “However unlikely [oligop-
oly recoupment] may be as a general matter, when the realities of the market and 
the record facts indicate that it has occurred and was likely to have succeeded, 
theory will not stand in the way of liability.”
87
 As discussed in Part I, an im-
portant reason the Court rejected oligopoly recoupment was the difficulty of co-
ordination, particularly without any allegation of conspiracy.
88
 Regardless of 
 
84. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 238 (1993). For 
a contrary view of the facts, see Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1736-37 (2013). 
85. See Robert D. Boroujerdi et al., Does Consolidation Create Value?, GOLDMAN SACHS 3 (Feb. 12, 
2014), http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3124001/Goldman-merger-analysis.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/KA5E-2234]. 
86. Id. at 8-20. There is interdependence between optimal merger control and predation liability. 
Merger policy must be particularly vigilant to the extent that an industry, once concentrated, 
is beyond regulation. If predation liability is deliberately underinclusive, then that places ad-
ditional pressure on merger control. Viewed from the other side, if lenient merger review per-
mits increased concentration, the optimal predatory pricing rule is more aggressive. 
87. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 229 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 
451, 466-67 (1992)). 
88. See supra Section I.B.1. 
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whether coordination by cigarette makers in the 1980s was feasible, other oli-
gopolies will sometimes be able to coordinate their predatory conduct and re-
coupment, even without a provable agreement.
89
 
B. Modern Economic Theory of Recoupment 
Brooke Group also should not determine the result when a plaintiff offers a 
modern economic theory of recoupment. In Brooke Group, the Court concluded 
that a particular strategy of oligopoly recoupment could not be supported by the 
facts of that case. But over the past forty years, economists have developed sound 
theories of recoupment that were not presented to or passed upon by the Court.
90
 
For example, a firm might develop a reputation for predation by its conduct in 
one or multiple markets, and thereby deter entry into and preserve monopoly 
profits in other markets.
91
 In that case, a predator could recoup its investment in 
below-cost prices even if supracompetitive pricing in the market in which the 
predation occurred did not suffice to recover the investment. A second recoup-
ment strategy is to exploit imperfections in capital markets to deny financing to 
the rival.
92
 
The relevance of modern recoupment theories was recognized in United 
States v. AMR Corp., which considered alleged predation by American Airlines at 
its Dallas-Fort Worth hub.
93
 In response to low-price competition from various 
LCCs on four city-pairs, American dropped its fares to match prices and in-
creased capacity by adding flights and switching to larger planes.
94
 The Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) sued, alleging that this conduct improperly induced the 
 
89. See generally C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013) (ex-
ploring the potential for parallel exclusion schemes to be effective without provable agreement 
among the excluders). 
90. Nor would all of these theories have been a good fit for the facts of the case as presented to 
the Court. 
91. See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 64, at 2299-2310 (describing the theory of reputa-
tion-based recoupment and supportive evidence drawn from the early history of local tele-
phone competition). 
92. See id. at 2285-99 (presenting the theory of financial market predation and describing evi-
dence). Yet another strategy is to mislead competitors into thinking that market demand is 
low or that the incumbent’s own cost is low, in order to bluff the would-be entrant into staying 
out of the market. See id. at 2311-21 (discussing the cost and demand signaling strategies). For 
reviews of feasible recoupment strategies, see Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, 
Monopolization and Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537 (Richard 
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); and Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and 
Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1720-39 (2013). 
93. 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). 
94. Id. at 1112. 
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exit of the LCCs, after which American raised its prices and reduced the fre-
quency of its flights. DOJ alleged that recoupment was accomplished in part by 
building a reputation for predation and thus deterring entry in both these routes 
and others.
95
 The district court granted summary judgment to American, con-
cluding that neither test of the Brooke Group framework had been satisfied.
96
 The 
Tenth Circuit affirmed on the ground (discussed below) that DOJ had not es-
tablished below-cost pricing and thus did not reach the analysis of recoup-
ment.
97
 
Even though the Tenth Circuit affirmed a judgment for the defendants, the 
court also recognized that modern theories of recoupment can provide a logical 
basis for sidestepping the skepticism of Brooke Group. It noted academic work 
concluding “that price predation is not only plausible, but profitable, especially 
in a multi-market context where predation can occur in one market and recoup-
ment can occur rapidly in other markets.”
98
 The court concluded: “Although this 
court approaches the matter with caution, we do not do so with the incredulity 
that once prevailed.”
99
 This open-minded approach is supported both by the 
evolution in economic thinking and by the need for different theories to describe 
facts quite different from those considered in Brooke Group.
100
 
C. Appropriate Measures of Cost and Revenue 
In making the price-cost comparison, Brooke Group also invites a flexible ap-
proach to the measurement of cost. Under the particular approach to predation 
that justifies use of a price-cost test, marginal cost—the cost of producing an 
 
95. Id. at 1111. 
96. Id. at 1113. 
97. Id. at 1120-21. 
98. Id. at 1115 (citing Baker, supra note 11, at 590); see also id. at 1114-15 (citing Bolton, Brodley & 
Riordan, supra note 64, at 2241, and quoting its statement that “[m]odern economic analysis 
has developed coherent theories of predation that contravene earlier economic writing claim-
ing that predatory pricing conduct is irrational”). 
99. Id. at 1115; see also Kenneth G. Elzinga & David Mills, Predatory Pricing, in 2 OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 40, 53 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol 
eds., 2015) (“The Brooke Group formula does not prevent a plaintiff from demonstrating that 
a defendant’s conduct fits the mold of a reputation-based predatory pricing theory . . . .”). 
100. In Spirit Airlines, plaintiffs apparently did not make a reputation argument. Kenneth G. El-
zinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing in the Airline Industry: Spirit Airlines v. Northwest 
Airlines (2005), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 307, 
312-13, 329 (John E. Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 6th ed. 2014). Nevertheless, the 
Sixth Circuit appeared to recognize such a theory in the course of discussing market definition 
and barriers to entry. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, 431 F.3d 917, 936 n.5, 947 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
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additional unit of output—is the theoretically correct measure of cost. However, 
marginal cost is difficult to measure, so parties and courts resort to proxies. The 
Court did not insist on a particular proxy for marginal cost, but instead left to 
lower courts the determination of an “appropriate” measure of cost. The Court 
mentioned, presumably as acceptable alternatives, both average variable cost 
(AVC) and incremental cost.
101
 The latter measure—the “avoidable” cost on the 
relevant increment of production—can often exceed AVC.
102
 With higher cost 
measures, aggressive price cutting is more likely to result in prices judged to be 
below cost. 
Where good incremental cost measures are available, courts can evaluate 
them. AMR acknowledged this flexibility, rejecting “[s]ole reliance” on route-
wide AVC because doing so “may obscure the nature of a particular predatory 
scheme.”
103
 The Tenth Circuit considered several price-cost tests offered by DOJ 
that employed incremental or avoidable cost, though the court ultimately found 
flaws in all of them. DOJ made the most headway with a test labeled “Test Four,” 
which compared price to the average avoidable cost of the extra capacity—that 
is, the costs that American would have avoided if it had not added extra capacity 
to the route at issue.
104
 The Tenth Circuit ultimately rejected Test Four on the 
narrow ground that the cost measure included some costs that were in fact una-
voidable, such as airport ticket agents.
105
 
The Tenth Circuit’s rejection of Test Four exemplifies the pull of Brooke 
Group towards more restrictive approaches to predatory pricing. In our view, 
Test Four was a sensible approach to evaluating American’s capacity expansion 
and illustrates more broadly how incremental cost measures can be used when 
evaluating a particular decision. 
 
101. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 n.1 (1993) (noting 
the parties’ agreement that AVC applies); id. at 223 (quoting the reference to incremental cost 
in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117-18 n.12 (1986)); id. at 256 n.16 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (same). 
102. If the incremental cost is upward sloping, it exceeds AVC at high volumes. An upward sloping 
incremental cost is plausible for airlines because, with added capacity, load factors fall, and 
hence the per-passenger cost is higher. See Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American 
Airlines Case: A Chance To Clarify Predation Policy (2001), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: 
ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 502, 515-16 (John E. Kwoka Jr. & Lawrence J. White, 
eds., 4th ed. 2004). 
103. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1116; see also id. (“[T]here may be times when courts need the flexibility 
to examine both AVC as well as other proxies . . . .”). 
104. Reply Brief for Appellant at 12, AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (No. 01–3202). 
105. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1119-20 (criticizing inclusion of “variable, non-proportional common 
costs . . . [including] (1) airport ticket agents, (2) arrival agents, (3) ramp workers, and (4) 
security”). 
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Measuring avoidable cost, however, often raises tricky technical issues. For 
example, in the context of capacity increases in the airline sector, an important 
component of avoidable cost is the cost of aircraft ownership. If an airline leases 
another plane in order to add capacity, the avoidable nature of this cost is obvi-
ous. If it instead adds capacity by redeploying the aircraft from another route, it 
incurs the opportunity cost of lost net revenues on that route.
106
 Absent good 
evidence of the full opportunity cost, measuring the cost of ownership, such as 
leasing rates, is a suitable proxy.
107
 In AMR, Test Four included the cost of air-
craft ownership;
108
 the Tenth Circuit did not decide whether including this cost 
was permissible.
109
 In Spirit Airlines, the Sixth Circuit accepted the inclusion of 
a market-based lease rate.
110
 
Brooke Group also offers some flexibility in evaluating revenue. A central 
question is to what extent a plaintiff is permitted to compare incremental revenue, 
rather than price, with cost. Using incremental revenue in response to a price cut 
or capacity expansion provides a revenue figure that is generally less than that 
implied by price—so using incremental revenue, rather than price, makes it more 
likely that the arrangement will be found to flunk the price-cost test. An increase 
in airline capacity may fail to yield much incremental revenue for two reasons. 
The first reason is passenger diversion. If the new plane is completely full, 
but with passengers that otherwise would take an existing flight, there is no in-
cremental revenue. Test Four took this effect into account. It did not simply look 
at the passengers that happened to sit on the new flight; it included only revenue 
attributable to those incremental passengers who would not have flown on 
 
106. This assumes the extra plane has a productive alternative use, as opposed to sitting idle in the 
desert due to an overinvestment in capacity. 
107. Had there been no redeployment, American can be presumed to have earned at least enough 
to cover its aircraft cost, or else it would have sold or leased the aircraft to others. 
108. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1118 & n.12 (describing VAUDNC-AC). 
109. The district court had rejected its inclusion on the incorrect ground that, for other purposes, 
aircraft ownership is considered a fixed cost. See id. (noting that aircraft ownership is “tradi-
tionally considered a fixed cost in the airline industry”). Compare Gregory J. Werden, The 
American Airlines Decision: Not with a Bang but a Whimper, ANTITRUST, Fall 2003, at 32, 34 
(suggesting that the Tenth Circuit likely viewed whether to include aircraft ownership as a 
disputed fact), with Aaron Edlin, Predatory Pricing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOM-
ICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 144, 162 & n.65 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012) (concluding that the Tenth 
Circuit rejected its inclusion). 
110. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 940 (6th Cir. 2005) (accepting a 
measure of costs, characterized as AVC, that included the “cost of the additional air-
craft . . . that represented the incremental capacity in Northwest’s response to Spirit’s pres-
ence”) (citation omitted). 
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American on that route but for the capacity increase.
111
 AMR accepted this ap-
proach, disagreeing with the district court’s critique that Test Four amounted to 
a short-run profit maximization test. 
Price erosion provides a second reason for low incremental revenues: re-
duced revenue from inframarginal units that the defendant otherwise would 
have sold at a higher price. DOJ offered a second test, labeled “Test One,” that 
took this effect into account. AMR illustrated the point with an example: 
[I]f an airline earned $20.6 million on a route that cost $18 million to 
operate, it would have $2.6 million in profit. If the airline then added a 
flight to the route that would cost $500,000 to operate, but brought in 
an additional $1 million in revenue from passengers, the airline would 
make $500,000 profit. If adding this extra capacity to the route reduced 
the profitability of other flights on that route, reducing revenue for the 
rest of the route by $600,000 down to $20 million, under Test One, this 
conduct would be considered predatory because rather than comparing 
the additional flight’s $1 million in revenue to its $500,000 in costs, Test 
One looks only to the reduction in profits on the route as a whole from 
$2.6 million to $2.5 million. Thus, this conduct would be labeled preda-
tory because the profits for the route as a whole declined, even though 
the capacity additions themselves were profitable and the route as a 
whole was still profitable.
112
 
In contrast to Test One, such conduct would be permitted under Test Four.
113
 
 
111. See Edlin & Farrell, supra note 102, at 515-16 (showing, in a hypothetical example with diver-
sion but no price erosion, that both Test One and Test Four condemn the capacity expansion); 
Werden, supra note 109, at 36 n.35 (distinguishing the tests on the basis that Test One took 
account of price erosion). 
112. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1118 n.13 (citing Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive 
Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 
YALE L.J. 681, 694 (2003)). Puzzlingly, the court incorrectly stated that “as long as a firm’s 
prices exceed its marginal cost, each additional sale decreases losses or increases profits.” Id. at 
1116 (citation omitted). This statement misses the reduced revenue on inframarginal units. 
113. The capacity increase would be condemned under Test Four if the lost revenue was due to 
diversion rather than price erosion. In terms of the hypothetical, suppose that the new flight 
has $1 million in revenue, of which $600,000 came from passengers diverted from other 
flights, which is the source of the $600,000 revenue reduction on the other flights. Then it 
would be condemned under Test Four: the $400,000 in incremental revenue attributable to 
the capacity increase is less than its $500,000 cost. 
 This example raises the question of whether AMR might have intended its hypothetical, 
and the associated critique, to apply to passenger diversion (in addition to profit erosion). We 
think not, for two reasons. First, if AMR rejected taking passenger diversion into account, it 
would have rejected Test Four on this ground, which it did not do. Second, the court cited and 
based its illustration on a discussion from an article by Einer Elhauge that appears to address 
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The AMR court’s assertion that the “capacity additions themselves were prof-
itable” begs the question of how one measures profit. When revenues on a new 
flight exceed the costs of that flight alone, the flight could in some sense be said 
to be profitable. But if the addition of a new flight reduces both revenue on other 
flights on the same route and profits on the route as a whole, the decision to add 
the new flight can hardly be called profitable. Nor can the addition of the new 
flight be said to be an efficient use of the firm’s assets. It can be said, however, to 
reflect a sacrifice of profits, presumably for some strategic purpose.
114
 
The AMR court rejected Test One as a “short-run profit-maximization” 
test.
115
 DOJ did not argue that any failure to maximize profits—such as by charg-
ing a lower price than the airline otherwise would—is actionable, and such an 
argument would seem to be foreclosed by Brooke Group. DOJ argued instead that 
a particular business strategy—which entailed an increase in capacity, a measur-
able reduction in profits, and a subsequent reversal after the rival had exited the 
market—should be regarded as predatory. DOJ presented good internal data and 
extrinsic evidence showing that American’s conduct was far from profit-maxim-
izing by American’s own reckoning.
116
 The specific facts available in the case thus 
reduced the likelihood of false condemnation.
117
 
The court’s rejection of Test One reflects literal fidelity to Brooke Group, 
which refers to “price” rather than incremental revenue. However, Test One 
might be squared with the Brooke Group framework by exploiting the Court’s 
comparative flexibility in the measurement of cost. As an economic matter, the 
cannibalized revenues taken into account by Test One could be treated as another 
 
only price erosion, not passenger diversion. See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To 
Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 
112 YALE L.J. 681, 694 (2003) (introducing an illustration of Test One by noting that it “nec-
essarily takes into account the fact that adding the incremental capacity lowered prices (and 
thus profits) on the nonincremental flights” (emphasis omitted)). 
114. In other areas of exclusionary conduct, a sacrifice approach yields a relatively narrow scope of 
liability, but here, the opposite is true. 
115. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1118. 
116. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellant at 6, AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (No. 01–3202) (“American 
added three seats for every additional local passenger it carried.”). 
117. If a firm’s internal documents about the profitability of its conduct indicate a sacrifice of profits 
(but for the opportunity to exclude a rival), we can be confident of the firm’s intent to exclude, 
which is in turn evidence of effect. Moreover, false negatives are less likely—and recoupment 
more likely—where industry structure and history indicate the ability to repel new entrants 
by, among other things, establishing a reputation for predation. 
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opportunity cost.
118
 Nevertheless, AMR rejected this approach, noting accu-
rately that “Test One effectively treats forgone or ‘sacrificed’ profits as costs.”
119
 
Presumably, the AMR court saw deducting diverted revenues on the route as 
departing from Brooke Group’s insistence on a price-cost comparison. 
The Sixth Circuit in Spirit Airlines sought to escape the price-cost test alto-
gether. It suggested that predation through capacity additions might not be gov-
erned by Brooke Group, and, hence, above-cost pricing can be challenged as un-
lawful monopolization.
120
 The court apparently thought that avoiding Brooke 
Group might be necessary to accommodate a comparison of incremental revenue 
and incremental cost from a capacity addition. We are skeptical that this ap-
proach is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. After all, adding capacity 
directly translates into changes in price and cost, and thus would appear to be 
within the Brooke Group framework. Unless and until the Supreme Court revisits 
Brooke Group, we expect courts will insist upon some sort of price-cost compar-
ison. 
*** 
In short, AMR and Spirit Airlines are fairly read as efforts to adapt the Brooke 
Group framework to the reality of modern predation cases. This is not to say the 
analyses are perfectly clear. Both courts struggled with highly complex facts, and 
the opinions are muddled in important respects.
121
 But, taken together, the cases 
reveal a willingness to evaluate recoupment realistically—rather than skepti-
cally—and to make use of incremental cost measures instead of AVC, where 
available. As such, we are not ready to wave the white flag and say that no pred-
atory pricing cases can prevail under Brooke Group; rather, we would counsel en-
forcers and parties to be creative about how to develop such cases and argue for 
flexibility within Brooke Group. Going forward, we believe that parties can liti-
gate successful predatory pricing cases under the Brooke Group framework—for 
example, by identifying instances of monopoly recoupment or the development 
of a reputation for predation. 
 
118. See Edlin, supra note 109, at 158 (proposing an “inclusive” cost measure along these lines). 
Alternatively, one could formulate an inclusive definition of price that included the lost reve-
nue from a reduced price on inframarginal units. 
119. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1118. 
120. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 951-53 (6th Cir. 2005). 
121. See supra notes 106-109, 111-113, and accompanying text (discussing uncertainties in AMR’s 
approach to aircraft costs and passenger diversion). 
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i i i . an unwarranted extension: loyalty discounts 
Brooke Group’s influence has extended beyond cases of simple price cutting. 
Its conclusory assertion that predatory pricing is rarely tried and even more 
rarely successful has been taken by some to mean that any conduct involving a 
profit sacrifice in order to exclude a rival is rare. Its conceptually simple idea of a 
price-cost test has proven attractive to those seeking to make the law of anticom-
petitive exclusion tractable and predictable. The Supreme Court itself has since 
repeated the assertion and extended the price-cost test to claims of monopsony 
overbidding
122
 and price squeezes, stating broadly in the latter case that “low 
prices are only actionable under the Sherman Act when the prices are below cost 
and there is a dangerous probability that the predator will be able to recoup the 
profits it loses from the low prices.”
123
 
We are concerned that the sometimes overly broad language in these cases 
and the more general influence of Brooke Group create a risk that Brooke Group’s 
framework will be applied to more complex pricing strategies for which it is un-
suited. One such strategy is a “loyalty” discount, in which a seller offers its cus-
tomers discounts on a single product or product line. In contrast to a quantity or 
volume discounts, which are based upon the quantity that the customer buys 
from the seller, loyalty discounts are based on the customer purchasing at least a 
specified percentage—or “share” of its total purchases—of a particular type of 
product from the seller, rather than its competitors. Loyalty discounts often take 
the form of so-called “first-dollar” discounts, where the customer receives a price 
reduction on all units purchased if it meets the specified share requirement. 
A full analysis of loyalty discounts is beyond the scope of this Feature. Here, 
we simply argue that Brooke Group’s price-cost test is the wrong tool for evalu-
ating this conduct. Determining whether Brooke Group ought to apply to loyalty 
discounts is an urgent task, not only because loyalty discounts are common, but 
also because several cases appear already to have taken that step. In Virgin Atlan-
tic Airways v. British Airways,
124
 for example, the Second Circuit rejected Virgin’s 
challenge to loyalty discounts offered by British Airways to travel agents, because 
Virgin had not proven that the discounts drove British Airways’ ticket prices be-
low cost. In Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Co.,
125
 the Eighth Circuit overturned 
a judgment for plaintiffs that had complained about Brunswick Corporation’s 
loyalty and quantity discounts, because the court found, among other grounds, 
that the discounted prices were above Brunswick’s costs. By contrast, the Third 
 
122. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007). 
123. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 457 (2009). 
124. 257 F.3d 256, 269 (2d Cir. 2001). 
125. 207 F.3d 1039, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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Circuit has eschewed any reliance on the price-cost test in this context.
126
 In 
short, the law in this area is unsettled and would benefit from an appreciation of 
the limits of Brooke Group. 
Like all discounts, loyalty discounts can be a form of output-enhancing price 
competition, and can mitigate the consequences of unanticipated market condi-
tions when the buyer is not the ultimate consumer. For example, a share-based 
discount enables a manufacturer to bear some of the risk that would otherwise 
be borne by its distributor, which might not be able to reach quantity targets 
needed for a discount in times of unexpectedly low demand. Conversely, a share-
based discount ensures that the distributor will continue to be motivated to pro-
mote the manufacturer’s product, even if unexpectedly strong demand would 
render a quantity-based threshold trivial. 
One possible application of Brooke Group would apply the discount to all 
units sold, and check whether the average net price is higher than some measure 
of cost. That approach has the virtue of simplicity, but it fails to reflect the par-
ticular risk to competition sometimes posed by loyalty discounts. In many cases, 
some level of a dominant firm’s sales will be “noncontestable” in the sense that 
rivals cannot as a practical matter compete for them, perhaps because of capacity 
constraints or customer brand preferences. In these cases, the discount is offered 
only to win contested sales. 
Thus, a more faithful adaptation of the price-cost test is to allocate the entire 
discount to the contested sales.
127
 After all, the competitor would have to match, 
by lowering its price on the contested sales, the entire discount offered by the 
defendant on both contestable and noncontestable sales. Consequently, if the 
 
126. In ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012), the Third Circuit found unlaw-
ful loyalty discounts that were combined with other forms of exclusionary conduct. The court 
relied on evidence that failure to meet the loyalty targets “would jeopardize [plaintiffs’] rela-
tionships with the dominant manufacturer of transmissions in the market,” id. at 278, which 
the court said made the loyalty targets in effect mandatory purchase requirements that should 
be evaluated as “de facto partial exclusive dealing arrangements,” id. at 282. See also Eisai, Inc. 
v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 409 (3d Cir. 2016) (ruling for the defendant on 
other grounds and declining to decide “when, if ever, the price-cost test applies to” “a discount 
that bundled incontestable and contestable demand”). 
127. This approach is in essence a discount attribution test, see Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 
515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008), applied to a loyalty discount instead of bundling. See Competitive 
Impact Statement at 14-15, United States v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., No. 7:11-cv-00030 
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011) (taking this approach and noting the analogy to Cascade Health); 12 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046, at 749e (3d ed. 2012); 
Robert H. Lande, Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, 2006 UTAH 
L. REV. 863, 878-80 (assessing and criticizing this approach). In Europe, it is known as the 
“as efficient competitor” test. See, e.g., Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n (Sept. 6, 2017), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-413/14 [http://perma.cc/EN3Y-QVYR]. 
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goal is to determine whether an equally efficient competitor can match the dis-
count, the relevant discount should be entirely allocated to the contested sales. 
However, allocating the discount by removing noncontestable sales gives rise 
to several practical problems. These include, among others, how to determine 
the amount of sales that are contested, how to determine the incremental costs 
associated with just the contestable sales,
 
and how to determine the size of the 
discount (which might be especially difficult if the seller does not specify a dis-
count but rather says, “if you buy X%, the price will be $Y”). 
The last problem suggests a more fundamental reason why a price-cost test 
might be unsuited to loyalty discounts. The test, as applied to predatory pricing 
claims, is explicitly intended to avoid false positives and promote aggressive, 
procompetitive price competition, even at the cost of false negatives. That cau-
tion reflects the intuition that a simple price cut benefits consumers.
128
 The wel-
fare benefit of a loyalty discount is much less clear. For one thing, a loyalty dis-
count might not entail an actual discount from the prices that would otherwise 
be charged. The commercial success of a loyalty discount depends largely on the 
relationship between the discounted price and the undiscounted price, so in 
some situations, the arrangement might entail an artificially inflated undis-
counted price intended to serve as a coercive lever to induce more sales at the 
nominally discounted price. A seller might be able to dispel the suspicion of such 
an arrangement if there are a substantial number of sales under comparable cir-
cumstances at the undiscounted price. However, absent such benchmarks, it 
might be difficult to determine what portion, if any, of the nominal discount 
reflects an actual discount from the price that would otherwise be charged. 
Moreover, while a simple price cut expands output in the short run, a loyalty 
discount might have the opposite effect if it deters a customer from making in-
cremental purchases from rivals that would not displace purchases from the 
dominant seller. Such incremental purchases from the rival would increase over-
all market output but push the percentage purchases from the dominant seller 
below the threshold required for the discount. And even where loyalty discounts 
reduce average prices, they might result in price discrimination among custom-
ers depending on what portion of their purchases are noncontestable, and some 
customers might wind up paying higher prices than they would in the absence 
of the loyalty discount. 
The upshot is that a facile application of the Brooke Group test to loyalty dis-
counts would be mistaken, even though loyalty discounts involve prices and 
“discounts,” and can thus seem similar to simple price cuts in a semantic sense. 
 
128. Reality is more complex. Even an above-cost price cut, though it benefits productive effi-
ciency, may harm consumers (and total welfare) by excluding competitors whose presence 
would keep down prices. See Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1199 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
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In devising an appropriate test, two factors seem particularly important. Identi-
fying the harm from discounting depends on knowing, first, whether the loyalty 
discount diminishes the rival’s ability to compete for other sales, and second, 
whether negative contracting externalities undercut a customer’s ability to refuse 
offers that would harm competition to its detriment.
129
 To answer these ques-
tions, a price-cost comparison provides no help. 
conclusion 
The Brooke Group framework, as interpreted by cases such as AMR and Spirit 
Airways, leaves courts free to conduct an empirically grounded evaluation of the 
likelihood of recoupment under the circumstances of each individual case. Under 
this approach, a court is free to consider the plausibility of recoupment, without 
reference to Brooke Group’s skeptical dicta, where monopoly or a well-coordi-
nated oligopoly is concerned. Moreover, modern theories of recoupment, such 
as the development of a reputation for predation, should be brought to bear 
when evaluating whether recoupment is likely. Courts can also use the presence 
of below-cost pricing as a basis for inferring recoupment, so long as it is not the 
sole basis for the inference. 
Brooke Group also permits flexibility in making price-cost comparisons. A 
measure of incremental cost can be used instead of AVC where good information 
is available. The analysis may also account for incremental revenue, though not 
to the extent of including in-market inframarginal revenue sacrifice due to a low 
price.  
Finally, there is nothing special about Brooke Group that suggests that its 
price-cost test should be extended to more complex pricing strategies like loyalty 
discounts. Indeed, the underlying concern with costly false positives which mo-
tivates the test is largely absent, and the practical problems seem insuperable. 
Sound policy analysis counsels against applying the Brooke Group principles to 
such cases. 
 
129. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Randal Heeb, A Framework for the Economic Analysis of Exclusionary 
Conduct, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 3 (Roger D. 
Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015). 
